| 引用本文: | 赵海岭,王维庆,李笑竹,等.发电侧多主体投资低碳综合微网氢储能的演化策略[J].电力系统保护与控制,2023,51(22):49-62.[点击复制] |
| ZHAO Hailing,WANG Weiqing,LI Xiaozhu,et al.Evolution strategy of low carbon integrated microgrid hydrogen energy storage with Multi-agents investment on the power generation side[J].Power System Protection and Control,2023,51(22):49-62[点击复制] |
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| 摘要: |
| 在低碳经济背景下，为提高向大用户直供能的灵活性，解决多主体在有限理性下共建共享的非对称性行为决策问题，提出多新能源场站联合投资低碳综合微网氢储能的演化行为分析方法。首先，利用异质性新能源场站发电与大用户用能的时空互补特性，提出多主体共享低碳综合微网氢储能的基本框架，使各发电主体形成“自平衡+直供电+余量上网”模式，在增强新能源友好并网能力与供用能灵活性的同时降低投资成本。然后，考虑多主体在参与氢储能共建共享时的非对称行为决策，基于复制者动态方程与演化稳定定理，对多新能源场站在有限理性下的多投资策略进行演化行为分析。最后，以我国西北部新能源汇集区域为算例对发电侧在联合投资中的合作行为进行推演，结果表明政府可通过对间断性发电特征的电站给予适当补助，或细化电价设置来激励异质性新能源场站的联合投资行为，从而促进氢储能的规模化发展；新能源场站则可通过提高装机容量来保证自身定值收益。 |
| 关键词: 发电侧 联合投资 低碳综合微网 演化博弈 行为分析 |
| DOI：10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.230320 |
| 投稿时间：2023-03-26修订日期：2023-08-24 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目资助(52267005，52067020)；新疆维吾尔自治区科技厅重大科技专项项目资助(2022A01004) |
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| Evolution strategy of low carbon integrated microgrid hydrogen energy storage with Multi-agents investment on the power generation side |
| ZHAO Hailing1,2,WANG Weiqing1,LI Xiaozhu1,CHENG Fangliang2,YANG Yongli2 |
| (1. Engineering Research Center of Ministry of Education for Renewable Energy Generation and Grid Connection
Technology, Xinjiang University, Urumqi 830047, China; 2. Power Exchange Center of State
Grid of Xinjiang Corporation, Urumqi 830002, China) |
| Abstract: |
| In the context of low-carbon economy, in order to improve the flexibility of direct energy supply to large users and deal with the asymmetric behavior decision-making of multi-agents jointly building and sharing under limited rationality, an evolutionary behavior analysis method of new energy station joint investment in low-carbon integrated microgrid hydrogen energy storage is proposed. First, based on the space-time complementarity between power generation by multiple new energy stations and energy consumption by large users, the basic framework of multi subjects sharing low-carbon integrated microgrid hydrogen energy storage is proposed, which makes each generation entity construct “self-imbalance+direct power supply+surplus grid purchase” mode. This is to decrease their investment cost while strengthening new energy friendly grid-connected capacity and power supply and consumption flexibility. Second, considering the asymmetric behavior decision-making of multiple entities in participating co-building and sharing, an evolutionary behavior analysis of multiple investment strategies for multiple new energy stations under bounded rationality based on replicator dynamic equations and an evolutionary stability theorem is conducted. Finally, the new energy gathering area in Northwest China is taken as an example and the cooperative behavior of generation side in joint investment is inferred. The results indicate that the government can incentivize joint investment behavior by providing appropriate subsidies to stations with intermittent power generation characteristics or refining electricity price settings. In this way it promotes the large-scale development of hydrogen energy storage. New energy stations can ensure their own fixed value benefits by increasing their installed capacity. |
| Key words: power generation side joint investment low-carbon integrated microgrid evolutionary game behavior analysis |
