Because of the randomness of the output of distributed power supply and the load demand of end users, there exists a deviation between the actual electricity purchased by the power service provider and the electricity bidding in the wholesale market. This brings a penalty cost. Therefore, by considering the controllable load on the demand-side as a schedulable resource, this paper proposes a multi-option controllable load power adjustment compensation contract in the form of a segmented price based on the cost function of increasing/reducing load for users of a controllable load. In order to achieve a win-win situation between power service providers and controllable load users, a Stackelberg master-slave game model with both economic benefit and demand response benefit for power service providers is established. A reverse induction method based on a genetic algorithm is used to solve this problem. Finally, the changes between the operating income of power service providers and the power adjustment amount of controllable load users under the condition of a segmented compensation price and fixed compensation price are compared by numerical results. These show that the proposed segmented compensation pricing method can significantly reduce the penalty cost, effectively improve the participation of user demand response, and achieve the optimal allocation of demand response resources. This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71931003 and No. 71420107027).