新电改背景下大用户直购双边博弈模型
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(武汉大学电气与自动化学院,湖北 武汉 430072)

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闵子慧(1996—),女,通信作者,研究生在读,研究方向为电力市场、新能源。E-mail:1220255839@qq.com

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国家自然科学基金项目资助(51507117)


Bilateral game model of large consumers’ direct purchasing under power system reform
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(School of Electrical Engineering and Automation, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China)

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    摘要:

    目前,我国电力市场正积极推进发电商与大用户双边交易。在此背景下,根据交易过程中各博弈主体所获取的信息情况变化,在交易初始不完全信息博弈阶段,基于暗标拍卖理论构建了发电商报价贝叶斯博弈模型,确定了发电商边际报价增长参数。在后续的多轮博弈中,考虑到现货市场对大用户直购的影响,以发电商报价和大用户购电分配作为博弈策略,构建了以各博弈方收益最大为目标的发电商与大用户主从博弈模型,并利用粒子群优化算法对模型进行了求解。最后对发电商和大用户的策略行为、大用户直购双边交易的市场影响进行了深入分析。

    Abstract:

    At present, the electricity market is actively promoting bilateral transactions between generation companies and large consumers in China. Under this background, according to the change of information acquired by the players in the trading process, this paper constructs a Bayesian game model based on sealed-bid auction theory in the initial stage of incomplete information game, and determines the marginal quotation growth parameters of generation companies. In the subsequent multi-round game, considering the influence of spot market on large power consumer’s direct buying, this paper constructs the master-slave game model between generation companies and large consumers from the two decision-making perspectives of the generation companies’ quotation and large consumer’s purchasing strategy. The aim of the model is to maximize the profit of each player. Based on Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm, the model is simulated and calculated. Finally, the strategic behavior of generation companies and large consumers and the market influence of bilateral direct purchase transactions for large consumers are analyzed in depth. This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 51507117).

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闵子慧,陈红坤,林洋佳,等.新电改背景下大用户直购双边博弈模型[J].电力系统保护与控制,2020,48(6):77-84.[MIN Zihui, CHEN Hongkun, LIN Yangjia, et al. Bilateral game model of large consumers’ direct purchasing under power system reform[J]. Power System Protection and Control,2020,V48(6):77-84]

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  • 收稿日期:2019-04-21
  • 最后修改日期:2019-07-11
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  • 在线发布日期: 2020-03-19
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