引用本文: | 吴浩可,雷霞,黄涛,何锦宇.价差返还机制下售电公司博弈模型[J].电力系统保护与控制,2019,47(12):84-92.[点击复制] |
WU Haoke,LEI Xia,HUANG Tao,HE Jinyu.A game-theoretic model for retail companies under the spread-rebate mechanism[J].Power System Protection and Control,2019,47(12):84-92[点击复制] |
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摘要: |
针对价差返还机制下新兴售电公司面临的申报价差难题,提出了基于双层电力市场结构的竞价博弈模型。引入售电公司总代理,统一购电并进行价差电费分配,以提高集中竞价市场的效率并降低售电公司的风险。在上层市场中,构造了发电企业与售电公司总代理间基于信息不对称的双边贝叶斯博弈模型;在下层市场中,考虑需求侧弹性,搭建售电公司决策模型。最后,通过一个简单算例验证了模型的可行性与有效性。 |
关键词: 价差返还机制 双层电力市场 售电公司总代理 博弈论 贝叶斯博弈模型 |
DOI:10.7667/PSPC20191210 |
投稿时间:2018-07-13修订日期:2018-09-28 |
基金项目:教育部春晖计划项目资助(Z2016145);国家自然科学基金项目资助(51677020,51877181);四川省教育厅重大培育项目资助(18CZ0018) |
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A game-theoretic model for retail companies under the spread-rebate mechanism |
WU Haoke,LEI Xia,HUANG Tao,HE Jinyu |
(Key Laboratory of Fluid and Power Machinery Xihua University, Chengdu 610039, China;Key Laboratory of Fluid and Power Machinery Xihua University, Chengdu 610039, China;Department of Energy, Politecnico di Torino, Torino 10129, Italy) |
Abstract: |
This paper presents a bidding model based on a two-stage electricity market structure to solve the bidding difficulties which emerging retail companies would face under the Spread-Rebate mechanism. In order to increase the market efficiency while reduce the risk of retailers, a general retailer agent, surrogate for all retailers, is modeled as the only buyer in the market who distributes the spread tariff among retailers after market clearing. In the upper stage, a bilateral Bayesian game model with asymmetric information between the generation companies and the general retailer agent is structured, whereas in the lower stage, a decision-making model with demand side elasticity for retail companies is built. Finally, an illustrative simple example is given to demonstrate the viability and effectiveness of the proposed method. This work is supported by the Chunhui Program of Ministry of Education (No. Z2016145), National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 51677020 and No. 51877181), and Educational Commission of Sichuan Province of China (No. 18CZ0018). |
Key words: Spread-Rebate mechanism two-stage electricity market general retailer agent game theory Bayesian game model |